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Legal Aspects of Farm Tenancy in Illinois
By H. W. HANNAH and JOSEPH ACKERMAN"
MOST
FARM TENANTS and a great many farm landlords
know very little about the legal aspects of the landlord-
tenant relationship. Yet where misunderstandings arise, as
they often do, the parties must finally depend upon the various prin-
ciples of tenancy recognized in law for a settlement of their differences.
A better knowledge of the nature and effectiveness, under the law, of
agreements made by landlord and tenant, and of the rights and duties
of the two parties, would prevent misunderstandings that otherwise
occur.
But much more than the avoiding of misunderstandings between
landlord and tenant is involved in the matter of a legal basis for
tenancy. Proper use of land, and satisfactory economic, social, and
cultural levels of farm life are all bound up in the question of
adequate functioning of the landlord-tenant relationship. If im-
provement is to be made in tenant farming, general knowledge of
legal provisions is necessary on the part of both tenants and landlords.
Dependence on oral leases and local custom tends to discourage change
and to preserve the existing practices and systems of farming, whether
good or bad. The importance to Illinois agriculture of adequate land-
lord-tenant relationships is suggested by the fact that nearly half the
farms in Illinois are operated by tenants.b
The purpose of this bulletin is to set forth and explain the bearing
of present laws on the farm-tenancy relationship in Illinois, and to
suggest ways in which these laws might be improved. The suggested
improvements are summarized in a discussion of a farm-tenancy code
for Illinois. A glossary explains most of the legal terms used.
For the determination of rights and duties existing between land-
lords and tenants, there are three principal sources of legal authority:
constitutional law, statutory law, and the common law as represented
in court decisions. In all these sources of authority, state law rather
than federal law is the controlling force. The federal constitution has
only a broad bearing on the problem; the federal government is pre-
sumably without power to regulate landlord-tenant relationships; and
federal common law is supposed not to exist.
*H. W. HANNAH, Associate in Agricultural Economics (member of Illinois
Bar) ; and JOSEPH ACKERMAN, formerly Associate in Farm Management.
"Forty-three percent, according to U. S. Census of Agriculture (1940).
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FARM-TENANCY LEGISLATION UNDER THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Altho no direct provisions for the landlord-tenant relationship or
the leasing of property are contained in the Illinois constitution, the
constitution must be considered in a discussion of farm-tenancy legisla-
tion because of the necessity that such legislation be constitutional.
The principle is well established that the general assembly has all
powers not denied it by the federal and state constitutions. A long
line of United States Supreme Court and Illinois cases upholds this
proposition. Another principle which is almost an axiom is that state
constitutions are limitations on the power of the general assembly and
not grants of power to it. State legislatures therefore examine the state
constitutions, not to see whether a contemplated exercise of power is
granted, but only to see whether it is denied.
As to the power of the Illinois legislature to pass laws regulating
the landlord-tenant relationship, there are no limiting clauses in the
Illinois constitution other than the general safeguards, including those
against special, discriminatory, and unreasonable legislation. In Stewart
v. Brady* the court said, "Whether an evil exists, and what means
should be adopted to prevent it, is a question for legislative determina-
tion." So long as legislative acts fall within the police power, that is,
so long as they promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the
people of the state, and so long as they do so in a reasonable manner
or by "due process of law," they will be constitutional. In Evans v.
Chicago Title and Trust Company, 2 the court held that "The legislature,
while not disturbing vested rights, may regulate tenure of land, its
acquisition, transfer, and rules of evidence affecting title."
3
Without discussing the question of constitutionality further, it is
safe to say that comprehensive farm-tenancy legislation can be made
constitutional in Illinois. Whether it is constitutional when and if
enacted and brought to issue, will depend upon how reasonable and
beneficial it is and how it is drafted.
1. Stewart v. Brady, 300 111. 425, 133 N. E. 310 (1921)
2. Evans v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 317 111. 11, 147 N. E. 412
(1925)
3. It is interesting to note that the Magna Carta, which furnished part of
the historical precedent for our national and state constitutions, placed certain
restrictions upon "keepers" of the land. One part reads, "The keeper of the
land of an heir under age shall take of the land none but reasonable issues,
reasonable customs, and reasonable services, and that without destruction and
waste of his men and his goods." Another reads, "The keeper, so long as he
shall have custody of the lands, shall keep up the houses, parks, warrens, ponds,
mills, and other things pertaining to the land, out of the issues of the same
land."
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ILLINOIS STATUTES ON FARM TENANCY
The Illinois legislature has at various times provided laws for the
protection of landlords and tenants. Many of the early enactments were
revised in 1873, and portions of that revision have since been amended
or changed and new laws added.4 Most of these enactments do not
specifically cover farm tenancy but apply to tenancy of all types of
property. Existing laws applicable to farm tenants and landlords may
be conveniently classified into four groups:
1. Those providing remedies for the collection of rent.
2. Those relative to the creation and termination of the tenancy.
3. Miscellaneous statutes bearing on farm tenancy.
4. Common law principles affecting farm tenancy.
Actions for Collection of Rent
Among the remedies which a landlord may use in an action for
rent are assumpsit, replevin, attachment, garnishment, the distress
proceeding, or an action of debt. All these actions have only a general
application and none are modeled specifically for the farm-tenancy
contract. The Illinois Civil Practice Act, passed in 1933, simplifies the
procedures of debt and assumpsit, 5 but does not, according to the
wording of the act, apply to the other actions.
Additional protection is afforded the landlord by the landlord's lien.
It will be discussed later in this section.
Debt and assumpsit. Debt and assumpsit are the actions speci-
fied for the recovery of rent under the act of May 1, 1873, 6 which
lists certain conditions under which owners, executors, or administra-
tors may sue for and recover rent or a fair and reasonable satisfaction
for the use of lands. None of the conditions listed in the act apply
to the usual farm-tenancy agreement, tho one provision applies where
lands are held and occupied without an agreement for rent, a situation
which has arisen occasionally in Illinois. In such instances the courts
have allowed the landlord a "fair and reasonable satisfaction" 7 for the
use of his land, provided a contract, either expressed or implied,
4. See generally Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80
5. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 110, sec. 125: "The provisions of this
act shall apply to all civil proceedings, both at law and in equity, unless their
application is otherwise herein expressly limited, in courts of record, except in
attachment, garnishment, replevin, or other actions in which the procedure is
regulated by special statutes." The action of distress is regulated by special
statute
; debt and assumpsit are not.
6. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 1. This section now states that
the rights given may be enforced "by a civil action."
7. Jackson v. Reeter, 201 111. App. 29 (1915)
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creating the relation of landlord and tenant could be shown. 8 A con-
tract to pay rent may be inferred from mere occupancy, unless circum-
stances deny the idea of tenancy. 9
Attachment, garnishment, and replevin. Attachment and gar-
nishment are statutory remedies offered to any creditor as means
of getting at the debtor's property and intangible assets. A landlord
may resort to them when he has established a right against his tenant
for rent due.
The action of replevin, provided by statute, lies when "any goods
or chattels shall have been wrongfully distrained, or otherwise wrong-
fully taken, or shall be wrongfully detained."
10
Replevin is frequently
used in cases where distress is taken for rent. The defendant has been
aided in this proceeding by an act simplifying the allegations 'necessary
on his part.
11
Distress for rent. 12 Under Illinois law a tenant's personal prop-
erty may be seized for rent:
"In all cases of distress for rent, the landlord, by himself, his agent or
attorney, may seize for rent any personal property of his tenant that may
be found in the county where such tenant shall reside; and in no case
shall the property of any other person, although the same may be found
on the premises, be liable to seizure for rent due from such tenant."
11
The last part of this section, a restriction on the common-law rule
that any property found on the premises could be distrained, 14 protects
the property of third parties.
The procedure for distraint is relatively simple. The landlord levies
his distress warrant against the tenant, sets apart the goods, prepares
an inventory, and then promptly files a copy of the warrant with the
clerk of a court of record of competent jurisdiction, or with a justice
of the peace if the amount claimed for rent does not exceed five
hundred dollars. 15 The advantage accorded the landlord under the dis-
tress statute is that he can legally hold the goods of the tenant prior to
8. Hadley v. Morrison, 39 111. 393 (1866) ; Boley v. Barutio, 120 111. 192, 11
N. E. 393 (1887)
9. Alexander v. Alexander, 52 111. App. 195 (1893)
10. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 119, sec. 1
11. Same, ch. 119, sec. 19: "It shall be sufficient for the defendant, in all
cases of replevin for distress taken for rent, to allege generally without par-
ticularly setting forth the tenure or title to the lands whereon such distress
was taken."
12. Same, see generally ch. 80, sees. 16-35
13. Same, ch. 80, sec. 16
14. Uhl v. Dighton, 25 111. 154 (1861)
15. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 79, sec. 16
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an adjudication of his claim for rent. 16 By levying a distress warrant
the landlord does not acquire a lien prior to all others, as has at times
been claimed. If, for example, the warrant is issued after an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, 17 or after sale to a bona fide
purchaser,
18 the landlord acquires no lien.
In actions of distress the tenant can avail himself of any set-off,
such as money due him from the landlord for materials or services,
or of other defenses generally allowable,
19 such as evidence that the
rent has been paid. The tenant may have his property released from
the distress warrant by posting a bond for double the amount of the
rent claimed.20
In cases where perishable property is involved, the court or justice
of the peace may allow its sale by the landlord or his agent, and pro-
vide that the money be deposited with the clerk of the court or justice
of the peace
21 to await the outcome of the action. Where rent is pay-
able wholly or in part in specific articles of property or products of
labor, the landlord may distrain for their value only. 22
If the judgment is in favor of the defendant he is entitled to
recover costs and have the distrained property returned.
23
There are two principal limitations on the use of the distress
procedure. First, the right does not extend beyond a period of six
months from the expiration of the term or termination of the tenancy
24
;
and, second, the tenant is allowed an exemption of the articles of
personal property which are by law exempt from execution. Crops
grown or growing upon the premises are not exempt.
25 Written leases
often contain waivers of the tenant's exemptions.
26 However, the
Illinois courts have held that since the exemptions are as much for
the benefit of the debtor's family as for the debtor himself, they may
not be waived by an agreement in advance of actual distress.
27 Thus
16. For a thoro discussion of the purpose and operation of the Illinois
distress procedure see Morgan v. Campbell, 89 U. S. 381, 22 L. Ed. 796 (1874)
17. Friedman v. Koppel, 257 111. App. 568 (1930)
18. Dawson v. Ellis, 151 111. App. 118 (1909)
19. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 21
20. Same, sec. 26
21. Same, sec. 27
22. Same, sec. 29
23. Same, sec. 25
24. Same, sec. 28. In Atkins v. Byrnes, 71 111. 326 (1874), the court said,
however, that the landlord need not wait until the expiration of the term to
distrain, but could do so any time rent fell due and remained unpaid.
25. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 30
26. See Parnell v. Daily, 163 111. 646, 45 N. E. 414 (1896)
27. Recht v. Kelley, 82 111. 147, 25 Am. Rep. 301 (1876)
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in Curtiss v. Ellenzvood28 the Illinois Appellate Court held ineffective
an attempted waiver clause in a lease providing that on failure to pay
rent when due the landlord could seize any property of the tenant.
The court indicated that such a waiver made in advance could be
accomplished only thru a chattel mortgage.
Articles of personal property which are exempt from execution by-
Illinois law are29 :
Necessary wearing apparel
Bible and school books
Family pictures
Pensions or bonuses received from state or federal government, for
one year after the receipt of each pension or bonus payment; any balance
at the end of one year after receipt of such payment is not exempt
Household furniture to the value of one hundred dollars (an. additional
$300 worth if the head of a family) ; or
Other property to the value of one hundred dollars, to be selected by
the debtor (an additional $300 worth if the head of a family)
The person in whose favor execution is issued may elect on what
property the levy will be made, excepting exempted property, and
provided that personal property shall be taken last.
30
Distress will not lie for obligations other than rent. In Bates v.
Hallinan,
31 a case involving a written crop-share lease providing that
the tenant should "cultivate in a husbandlike manner," it appeared that
the tenant did a very poor job of farming. Evidence disclosed that
he probably should have raised 8,000 bushels of corn whereas he
raised only 3,000. In the distress action the landlord included a re-
quest for one-half of the 5,000 bushels of corn the tenant should have
but did not raise. The court held the distress could be levied only
against what had been raised, and that some other remedy must be
used to recover damages for the failure to cultivate in a husbandlike
manner.
Distress before rent is due. Distress proceedings are not ordi-
narily commenced until the tenant has defaulted. In the Illinois act
relating to distress, however, there is a provision which under certain
conditions allows distress before the rent is due. The provision states
that a landlord may institute distress "if any tenant shall, without the
consent of his landlord, sell and remove, or permit to be removed,
or be about to sell and remove, or permit to be removed, from the
28. Curtiss v. Ellenwood, 59 111. App. 110 (1894)
29. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 52, sec. 13
30. Same, ch. 77, sec. 11
31. Bates v. Hallinan, 220 111. 21 (1906)
1940] LEGAL ASPECTS OF FARM TENANCY 245
demised premises, such part or portion of the crops raised thereon, as
shall endanger the lien of the landlord upon such crops for the rent
agreed to be paid."
32 The right to so distrain is one conferred by
statute only, and the courts have construed the statute very strictly,
holding that the landlord's lien must be clearly endangered before the
right to distrain exists, and that the landlord cannot invoke this
section of the statute merely to harass and embarrass his tenant.
33
Whether or not a landlord's lien is actually endangered is a hard
question to answer. In a case where a tenant actually removed and
sold a portion of the crops raised, and it was shown that such action
did endanger the landlord's lien, the right to distrain was upheld.
34
In this case the question arose as to whether the execution of a chattel
mortgage was such a disposal of crops by the tenant as would allow the
distress proceeding. In answering in the negative the court said that
the statute must be strictly construed, and that the execution of a
chattel mortgage was only a conditional disposal not contemplated by
the act. In Hopkins v. Wood35 the Appellate Court held that feeding
crops to livestock might endanger the landlord's lien and constitute a
"removal" within the meaning of the act. Illinois law pertaining to
chattel mortgages on feed crops makes a distinction between the feeding
of such crops to work animals and to productive livestock.36 The
mortgagor can feed mortgaged crops to productive livestock so long
as the animals also are included in the mortgage; also he may feed
mortgaged feeds to work animals so long as the animals are used to
produce crops which are mortgaged, even tho the animals are not
included. This law might affect decisions on "removal."
Landlord's Lien on Crops
A significant measure for the protection of farm landlords exists
in the form of a statutory lien for rent upon crops grown or growing.
The language of the act providing for the lien is as follows37 :
"Any landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing
upon the demised premises for the rent thereof, whether the same is pay-
able wholly or in part in money or specific articles of property or products
of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful performance of the terms
of the lease. Such a lien shall continue for a period of six months after
32. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 35
33. Hill v. Coats, 109 111. App. 266 (1903)
34. Gross v. Schraeder, 70 111. App. 625 (1896) ; Johnson v. Cippery, 19 111.
App. 638 (1886)
35. Hopkins v. Wood, 79 111. App. 484 (1898)
36. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 95, sec. la
37. Same, ch. 80, sec. 31
246 BULLETIN No. 465 [April,
the expiration of the term for which the premises are demised, and may
be enforced by distraint as in this Act provided."
The last clause, providing that the lien may be enforced by distraint,
was added after the Illinois courts interpreting an earlier lien statute
had held that distraint was not a proper remedy for the enforcement of
the lien. The section previously discussed, dealing with the use of
distress before rent is due, is looked upon as a means of protecting this
lien.
The effectiveness of the act has been determined to a great extent
by the interpretation put upon it by the Illinois courts. The language
"upon the crops grown and growing" has been definitely in-
terpreted to mean crops only and not other goods and chattels of the
tenant.38 "Grown or growing" refers to the year the crops ,are in the
ground, and the landlord's lien is good only for that year's rent.
39
However, any crop which may be sowed in the autumn of one year
and harvested in the next is subject to the lien for rent for either or
both years.
40
"Upon the demised premises" refers to all land under the
lease and includes all crops grown on such demised premises, regard-
less of who grew them whether sublessees or someone at the will of
the tenant.41 The lien attaches at the time the crop begins to grow,42
and is good against all crops or any portion of any crop for any rent
due from all or any portion of the premises.
43 If a tenant holds under
distinct leasings, however, and has paid the rent on part of the leasings,
it has been held that the lien on crops grown on these leasings does not
extend to rent due on the others.44
The landlord's lien, since it is created by statute, is paramount to
other claims against crops of the tenant, and can be lost only by waiver
or failure to enforce within the time specified.
45 In Travers v. Cook46
the court refused to allow the landlord a recovery in replevin against
a constable who had levied an execution against the crops of the
tenant; but the refusal was on the grounds that title and possession
38. Felton v. Strong, 37 111. App. 58 (1890)
39. Frink v. Pratt & Co., 130 111. 327, 22 N. E. 819 (1889) ; Miles v. James, 36
111. 399 (1865)
40. Nelson v. First Nat. Bank of La Harpe, 184 111. App. 349 (1914) ;
Miles v. James, above
41. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 32; Uhl v. Dighton, 25 111.
154 (1861)
42. Watt v. Schofield, 76 111. 261 (1875) ; Harvey v. Hampton, 108 111. App.
501 (1903)
43. Thompson v. Mead, 67 111. 395 (1873)
44. Gittings v. Nelson, 86 111. 591 (1877)
45. Lillard v. Noble, 159 111. 311, 42 N. E. 844 (1895)
46. Travers v. Cook, 42 111. App. 580 (1891)
1940] LEGAL ASPECTS OF FARM TENANCY 247
still remained with the tenant and that the lien alone did not give the
landlord the right to maintain replevin. In Rickey v. Ford* 1 the land-
lord recovered from a mortgagee who had taken the crops and sold
them with knowledge of the landlord's lien.
According to the interpretation of the courts, knowledge on the
part of the purchaser of the existence of the lien is a necessary fact in
establishing the validity of the lien against third parties. In Relnhardt
v. Blanchard4 * the court said: "When the purchaser of grain from a
tenant knows the fact of such tenancy, and that his vendor, as such
tenant, had raised the grain on the demised premises, it will be such
notice as to put him upon inquiry as to the landlord's lien." If, how-
ever, the purchaser has no knowledge of the tenancy and the origin
of the grain, he is not subject to the landlord's lien.49
The practical outcome of this interpretation is that a landlord who
wants to make sure his liens are preserved, should notify all prospective
purchasers of the tenant's crop of his interest in it. Landlords who
have many tenants find it good practice simply to supply all local
elevator companies with lists of their tenants.
A lien does not of itself give the landlord a right to immediate
possession of the crops.
50 Before the landlord can recover his share in
an action of replevin, the crop must be divided and the landlord's share
designated because the crop belongs entirely to the tenant until this has
been done. 51 While replevin and distress have been the attempted
actions in many instances, they are not the only remedies available
for the enforcement of the landlord's lien; other procedures, such as
foreclosure or the filing of a claim seeking preference among the
tenant's creditors, may be used. 52
Many leases contain provisions which purport to create liens on all
property belonging to the tenant. Illinois courts hold that such provi-
sions are, in effect, chattel mortgages, and to be valid must be acknowl-
edged and recorded according to the law on chattel mortgages.
53
47. Richey v. Ford, 84 111. App. 121 (1899)
48. Reinhardt v. Blanchard, 78 111. App. 26 (1898). See also Lawrence v.
Elmwood Elevator Co., 258 111. App. 101 (1930) ; Carter v. Anderson, 56 111. App.
646 (1894) ; Lynch v. Smith, 154 111. App. 469 (1910)
49. Finney v. Harding, 136 111. 573 (1891); Faith v. Taylor, 69 111. App.
419 (18%)
50. Wright v. Wilson, 179 111. App. 630 (1913) ; Chapin v. Miles and
Ricketts, 151 111. App. 164 (1909)
51. Pearson v. Reese, 286 111. App. 511, 3 N. E. (2d) 929 (1936) ; Sargent
y. Courrier, 66 111. 245 (1872)
52. Faubel v. Michigan Avenue Boulevard Building Company, 278 111. App.
159 (1934)
53. Gubbins v. Equitable Trust Co., 80 111. App. 17 (1898) ; Packard v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 67 111. App. 598 (1896)
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Abandonment and Emblements
Illinois law provides that in cases where a tenant abandons or
removes from the premises or any part of the premises, the landlord
or his agent may seize upon any grain or other crops grown or growing
upon the premises or the part abandoned, even tho the rent is not yet
due. 54 The landlord may cultivate, harvest, and sell the crop, taking
out his rent and the expense to which he has been put, and giving the
remainder over to the tenant. The tenant is privileged, however, to
redeem the crops by tendering the rent and a reasonable compensation
for expenses incurred by the landlord in handling the crop.
In Bumgardner v. Scaggs55 the question arose whether under the
abandonment act a landlord, when a tenant has removed from the
demised premises at the expiration of a lease, may seize wheat or any
other crop maturing after the expiration of the lease. The court
answered rather clearly that the act did not so apply, but was meant to
apply only to the growing and maturing of crops during the year for
which the lease was executed. The court distinguished, and rightly so,
between actual abandonment during the year of the lease and removal
at the end of a term. A tenant moving at the expiration of his lease
but before harvesting wheat may return and harvest the crop. Such
right, known as the right to emblements, is a well-established prin-
ciple of law.
56 The crops which may be so harvested by a tenant
after the expiration of his lease are spoken of as "away-going crops."
The rule giving the tenant a right to emblements is an exception to the
common-law rule that growing crops follow the title to real estate. 57
Creation and Termination of Tenancy
The stability of a tenancy relationship is determined by the certainty
of the beginning, duration, and termination of the lease. Since many
who rent farm lands do not use written agreements or arrive at any
definite understanding for the length, termination, and renewal of the
54. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 33
55. Bumgardner v. Scaggs, 180 111. App. 668 (1913)
56. In Roberts v. McAllister, 226 111. App. 356 (1922), the court said:
"There can be no question as to the right of a tenant holding under a life tenant
to sow annual crops and should the life tenant die before such crops are ma-
tured and harvested, the undertenant may mature, harvest, and remove the
same. The right is called the right of emblements. It arises from the force
of necessity and public policy. It has for its purpose the encouragement of
agriculture and the protection of the life tenant and undertenant if any."
57. See Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank .v. McCambridge, 343 111. 456, 175
N. E. 834 (1931)
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term, the Illinois legislature has attempted to bring about more certainty
in this matter.
The statute of frauds limits unwritten contracts. Illinois has
enacted as a part of its law the essential elements of the old English act
against frauds and perjuries providing, among other things, that under
certain circumstances parties cannot be held responsible for agree-
ments that are not in writing.
58
Illinois courts have held that a lease is a "chattel real," and does
not constitute a sale of property.
59 If leases are excluded from the
operation of the section of the statute of frauds governing the sale of
land, on the theory that they are "chattels real," they will then fall
under the provisions of Section I,60 which will give the same result,
since it provides that "No action shall be brought, whereof to charge
.... any person upon any agreement .... that is not to be per-
formed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless
the promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized."
These provisions render void oral leases which cannot be per-
formed within one year from the date of making.61 In other words an
agreement to lease for a year, arrived at before the tenant is in pos-
session, is void as a "chattel real," since more than one year must
elapse before it is fulfilled. Usually the oral agreements which farm
landlords and tenants make cannot be performed in one year; and
consequently when such oral agreements are made, each party has
legally only such rights as are commonly given landlords and tenants
in similar circumstances. These rights may not be the same as those
the parties agreed to orally, but will be determined by common law and
custom.
To come under the statute of frauds, however, a lease must be
wholly oral. A court has held that a telegram signed and sent by a
landlord in response to an offer contained in a written communication
is a memorandum in writing and prevents the lease being voided by the
statute of frauds. 62 The absence of any writing at all in such a large
58. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 59, sec. 2
59. People v. City of Chicago, 335 111. 450, 167 N. E. 79 (1929)
60. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 59, sec. 1
61. Rader v. Huffman, 125 111. App. 554 (1906); Molliter v. C. M. Thorn
Van Co., 118 111. App. 293 (1905)
62. Gaines v. MeAdam, 79 111. App. 201 (1898)
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number of cases has emphasized the need for written leases ; it has also
led to the legal recognition of so-called "tenancies from year to year."
Tenancies from year to year. It has been estimated that three-
fourths of all tenant farmers in the United States operate farms under
inadequate oral agreements. This is cited as a major weakness of the
tenancy system. That both landlords and tenants may have some meas-
ure of protection under these circumstances, the courts have created,
and the statutory law of Illinois and many other states now recognizes,
what are known as "tenancies from year to year."
The rule is well established in chancery that an oral contract even
tho it is void because of the statute of frauds, may be enforced if
one party relies on the contract and makes a substantial performance. 68
Tenancies from year to year arise from the same principle. The legis-
latures and courts merely say in effect: "If no notice is given by either
party within a certain period (in Illinois not less than 60 days nor more
than 4 months prior to 60 days before the termination of the tenancy) 64
a lease for another year exists."
65 In Illinois most tenancies commence
on March 1, so the usual effect of the statute is to require that notice be
given between September 1 and December 30. The provisions of such
leases continue the same as in the original agreement.
66 When written
leases are not renewed and the tenant remains on the farm, a tenancy
from year to year exists. The written lease no longer applies except as
the courts are willing to say that its provisions carry over.
The statutory provisions with respect to the notice necessary to
terminate a
"tenancy from year to year" have been rigidly adhered to
in court interpretations. The statute requires that the notice must
be in writing and that it must be given within the period mentioned
above. The courts have held, in accordance with the statute, that a




notice must be signed by one having authority ; that it must accurately
describe the property in question
68
;
and that the right to notice is
reciprocal.
69
63. Morrison et al v. Herrick et al, 130 111. 631, 22 N. E. 537 (1889). See
also Doubet v. Doubet, 186 111. App. 316 (1914), holding that plowing and
sowing in reliance on an oral agreement were such acts as would take a lease
out of the statute of frauds.
64. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 5
65. Lake v. Campbell, 18 111. 106 (1856); and Tanton v. Van Alstine, 24
111. App. 405 (1887)
66. Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner et al, 99 111. 151 (1881)
67. Willhite v. Schurtz, 294 111. 309, 128 N. E. 551 (1920)
68. Sheldon v. Sutherland, 222 111. App. 598 (1921)
69. See Tanton v. Van Alstine, in note 65
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In determining whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists
and whether or not the arrangement can be called a tenancy from year
to year, the Illinois courts have said that the reservation of an annual
rent is the leading circumstance.
70 The intention of the parties as to the
control to be reserved in the landlord, and the amount of seed, equip-
ment, or other items furnished by the landlord are also considered by
the courts. 71
At best, the judicial creation of a tenancy from year to year is a
weak substitute for an agreement in writing, even tho it does accom-
plish some good for those who never take the trouble to enter into
specific written agreements.
71a
Removal of Fixtures by Tenant
Under Illinois law a tenant has protection against the loss of such
removable improvements as he has made at his own expense during
his tenancy. The language of the act giving this protection is as
follows:
"Subject to the right of the landlord to distrain for rent a tenant shall
have the right to remove from the demised premises all removable fixtures
erected thereon by him during the term of his- lease, or of any renewal
thereof, or of any successive leasing of the premises while he remains in
possession in his character as tenant."
72
To the protection thus granted there are at least three limiting
factors which make the statute, as the Appellate Court expressed it in
Donnelly v. Thieben,
73
"a. privilege allowed him [the tenant], rather
than an absolute right to the things themselves." The first limitation
is that the removal by the tenant must be made "while he remains in
possession in his character as tenant;" the second is that he can take
only "removable fixtures," the ultimate definition of "removable"
being left to the court in each instance ; the third is that he cannot
remove fixtures so long as he is subject to distress for rent.
This statute on removal of fixtures was not written primarily for
agricultural leases ; consequently the great majority of decisions con-
struing it do not involve farm improvements or equipment. There are
a few decisions in point, however, which may indicate the answer to
situations arising in the future. In Hacker v. Munroe
1* the court laid
70. Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 111. 457 (1876)
71. Creel v. Kirkham, 47 111. 344 (1868)
71a. See Illinois Circular 503, "Farm Leases for Illinois," for a discussion of
the advantages of a written lease and for recommended lease forms
72. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 34
73. Donnelly v. Thieben, 9 111. App. 495 (1881)
74. Hacker v. Munroe, 176 111. 384, 52 N. E. 12 (1898)
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down three generally recognized tests to determine whether a fixture
is or is not realty:
1. Is it annexed to the realty?
2. Is it applicable to the use of the realty to which it is attached?
3. What was the intention of the party making the annexation?
These are not the only tests used, however. The possibly injurious
effect of a removal upon the freehold, the understanding existing
between the landlord and tenant (either at the time of construction or
later), and the effect of such removal upon innocent third parties all
have entered into court decisions in such cases. In Smyth v. Stoddard, 75
for example, the court held that a blacksmith shop on skids, brought
to the premises by the tenant and removed by him, was a removable
fixture, but that a corncrib built on posts set in the ground Was not a
removable fixture despite the fact that the landlord had agreed orally
with the tenant that the latter could take the crib with him. Apparently
the reason for the latter decision was not that the posts were set in the
ground, but that the farm had been sold to a third party who thought
that the corncrib went with it. In Miller v. Bennett the Appellate
Court held that a corn elevator set in a concrete foundation, without
any agreement having been made for its removal, could not be removed
thru a suit instituted after the termination of the tenancy.
A lease or separate written agreement may be made to provide that
all fixtures supplied by a tenant at his own expense can be taken by him,
regardless of injury to the real estate, 77 or that the tenant will be com-
pensated at an agreed rate for the unexhausted value of the improve-
ments he does not remove. In such cases, of course, the tenant is
protected. (See page 267 for a further discussion of compensation.)
The question often arises why a tenant, if he is not allowed to
remove a fixture, cannot exact compensation from the landlord. In
Diederich v. Rose78 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the right of a
tenant to exact payment for improvements comes from express contract
only. Tenants often make improvements without securing any such
agreement, and are unable to force compensation.
The language of the statute rigidly construed precludes a tenant's
removing fixtures after he ceases to remain in possession as tenant. If
he holds over after the expiration of the term of the lease, his right of
75. Smyth v. Stoddard, 203 111. 424, 67 N. E. 980, 96 Am. St. Rep. 314 (1903)
76. Miller v. Bennett, 239 111. App. 306 (1925)
77. Sanitary District of Chicago v. Cook, 48 N. E. 461, 169 111. 184, 39 L.
R. A. 369, 61 Am. St. Rep. 161 (1897)
78. Diederich v. Rose, 228 111. 610, 81 N. E. 1140 (1907)
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removal ceases to exist. 79 This rigid interpretation might of course
work injustice in certain specific cases. A liberal view was taken in
an early appellate court decision which held that the tenant could
remove fixtures within a "reasonable time" after the expiration of the
lease. 80 The best policy for the tenant is, of course, for him to take the
removable fixtures before the expiration of the lease.
Further light on the attitudes taken by courts toward the removal
of farm fixtures is afforded by two Indiana cases. In Ricketts v.
Darrell81 the court held that where stakes and rails had been wrongfully
taken by a party and used for fencing his land, the rightful owner
could not replevy them because they had become a part of the wrong-
doer's real estate. In McCracken v. //a//82 the court held that a pump
placed in a well by the tenant could be removed.
Mechanics' lien for work ordered by tenant. An interesting
problem has arisen in Illinois under the mechanics' lien statute in
cases where the tenant has requested work done on the landlord's
property. In Fehr Construction Company v. Postal System of Health
Building
83 the court held that where the tenant makes permanent
improvements with the consent or knowledge of the landlord, the
mechanics' lien will attach to the property. It is not clear at what point
the lack of consent of the landlord would preclude the lien.
Eviction and Suits for Possession of Land
Three principal modes of legal action for bringing about the forcible
removal of tenants are available to Illinois landlords. It should be
remembered that none of the statutes on which these actions are based
are set up specifically for farm leases.
Forcible entry and detainer. The action of forcible entry and
detainer84 may be maintained when a tenant refuses to leave after the
expiration of his lease or after due notice to quit the premises. The
first section of this act states: "That no person shall make an entry
into lands or tenements except in cases where entry is allowed by law,
and in such cases he shall not enter with force, but in a peaceful
manner."85 This section is a limitation on the use of the action rather
79. Dreiske v. People's Lumber Co., 107 111. App. 285 (1903)
80. Sherman v. Saylor, 36 111. App. 356 (1889)
81. Ricketts v. Darrell, 55 Ind. 470 (1876)
82. McCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30 (1855)
83. Fehr Construction Company v. Postal System of Health Building, 288
111. 634, 124 N. E. 315 (1919)
84. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 57
85. Same, sec. 1
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than an expansion of it. In Burns v. Nash86 the Appellate Court said,
"In this Act there is discernible a. certain public policy, based on
humane considerations of the wrong, oppression, and hardships which
might ensue if families, in any kind of weather, at any time of day or
night, might be forcibly ejected from their homes, with all their effects,
without notice or warning."
Since this action of forcible entry and detainer is based on the
right to possession rather than to title, a new lessee can institute a suit
to dispossess the old tenant holding over.
87 The action can be brought
before a justice of the peace and a six-man jury. The judgment may
be for only a part of the premises if the facts show that the plaintiff is
entitled to no more. Provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act
apply.
Ejectment. A second remedy open to a landlord to recover pos-
session of his property from a tenant after expiration or breach of a
lease is ejectment. Ejectment may be brought by "any person claiming
an estate in land, in fee for life or years, either as heir, devisee, or
purchaser."
88 Such person must be able to show a present right to the
property. It is possible for the landlord in an ejectment proceeding
also to recover damages for rents and profits; a separate action is not
necessary. A statement of such claims may be filed at any time within
a year after the judgment in ejectment. Where a tenant is sued in
ejectment by a party other than the landlord, the tenant must give
the landlord immediate notice, because the landlord's title may be put
in jeopardy by this action.
Summary judgment on affidavit. A third and simpler device
for the recovery of land exists under a provision of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act. Section 57 of the Act89 provides that: "subject to rules,
if the plaintiff, .... in any action to recover the possession of land,
with or without rent or mesne profits, .... shall file an affidavit or
affidavits, on the affiant's personal knowledge, of the truth of the facts
upon which his complaint is based and the amount claimed .... the
court shall enter a judgment in his favor .... unless the defendant
shall . . . .
"
file an affidavit showing a good defense.
The advantage of this summary-judgment proceeding is that it
greatly simplifies the plaintiff's action in cases where the defendant is
clearly in the wrong.
86. Burns v. Nash, 23 111. App. 552 (1887)
87. Allen v. Webster, 56 111. 393 (1870)
88. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 45
89. Same, ch. 110, sec. 181
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Miscellaneous Statutes on Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Altho the Illinois laws most directly affecting farm tenancy have
been discussed, there remain some others which are worthy of men-
tion because of their indirect bearing on the problem.
Arbitration. That a system of arbitration be established to
enable farm landlords and tenants to settle disputes readily and inex-
pensively is a recommendation frequently made by those interested
in farm-tenancy legislation. There now exist in many states, including
Illinois, statutes providing generally for the submission of disputes to
arbitration. In early cases under these arbitration statutes many courts
were hostile toward them and held them unconstitutional, the argument
being that judicial powers belonging to the courts had been conferred
on arbitrators. This feeling has partially disappeared, owing no doubt
to the statutory and judicial limitations that have been placed upon the
use of arbitration.
The Illinois arbitration act90 provides that:
"
.... all persons having requisite legal capacity may, by an instru-
ment in writing to be signed by them, submit to one or more arbitrators to
be named in the manner indicated by such writing, any controversy existing
between them, and may, in such submission, agree that any court of com-
petent jurisdiction, or any court therein named (provided it is of competent
jurisdiction) may pass upon any questions of law arising in such arbitra-
tion proceedings, and that a judgment or successive judgments, of such
court shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such submission,
and for payment of fees and costs of the arbitrator or arbitrators."
This act has been before the Illinois Supreme Court many times
and certain questions of interpretation which have arisen seem to be
well settled. In White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek91 the court said,
"The object of arbitration is to avoid the formalities, delay, and ex-
pense attending litigation in court, and it has been recognized from a
very early period by the common law as a method of settling disputes."
Substantially the same language appears in Podolsky v. Raskin,
9*
decided a year earlier.
The Illinois statute is of the general type which coordinates the
arbitration procedure with the local court, it being possible for a court
of competent jurisdiction to pass upon matters of law involved in the
controversy and to enter judgment on the award. It is true, of course,
that the arbitration method was recognized at common law, and that
90. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 10, sec. 1
91. White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 111. 240, 129 N. E. 753 (1921)
92. Podolsky v. Raskin, 294 111. 443, 128 N. E. 534 (1920)
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an award when finally made under common-law procedure could be
sued upon, but there was no way of forcing a party to continue the
arbitration to the point where an award could be made. .One thing
which the Illinois Act did in cases coming under it was to make irre-
vocable the agreement to arbitrate. In the case previously cited, White
Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek^ the constitutionality of the act was
attacked on the ground that by making the agreement irrevocable it
conferred judicial powers on the arbitrators. The court refused to
uphold this contention, saying that the statute did not confer judicial
powers on the arbitrators, and that the election to use the proceeding
was a voluntary matter. It is significant in this connection that even in
cases where the court refers a pending case to arbitrators, the consent
of the parties concerned is essential.
Some questions may arise as to the value of arbitration proceedings
when the statutory provision ties the procedure so closely to the courts.
There is an advantage, however, in such an arrangement. Not only can
many awards be made without the active intervention of the court, but
when an award made under the supervision of the court is sued upon,
the plaintiff can base his claim upon the award rather than upon the
original cause of action.
Of special significance from the standpoint of arbitration legislation
specially designed for landlord-tenant differences is the Illinois prec-
edent with respect to general agreements to arbitrate. In White Eagle
Laundry Co. v. Slawek, cited on page 255, and Cocalis v. Nazlides95
the court held that a general agreement between two parties to submit
to arbitration all controversies which might arise between them in
the future is void. The enforcement of the agreement would, in the
opinion of the court, deprive a party of his right to resort to judicial
process if a controversy should arise. This rule voiding general
agreements to submit future controversies to arbitration seems to be
well settled in Illinois. However, this fact should not discourage using
such agreements, because if the parties in a controversy stand by their
agreement, the benefits of arbitration can still be realized.
Difference between arbitration and appraisal. An agreement to
settle by appraisal some well-defined special problem which may arise
in the future will, however, hold under Illinois law, because such an
agreement has been described by Illinois courts as something different
from an agreement to arbitrate future controversies. In the Cocalis
case the court said that such a provision really amounts to an agreement
that a certain fact will be required as a condition precedent to a
93. Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 111. 152, 139 N. E. 95 (1923)
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recovery, citing the proof-of-loss clause in insurance contracts as an
example. The court said further, "If there is no matter in dispute there
is no question for arbitration, and accordingly it was held in Morton v.
Gale, 95 111. 533, where annual rent was to be ascertained by appraisers,
their decision was not an arbitration because there was no matter in
controversy when the leases were executed." A similar conclusion was
reached in Pearson v. Sanderson** in which case a question arose over
a provision in a lease for appraisers to establish the value of improve-
ments remaining at the termination of the lease. The court held that
such appraisal was not arbitration because no controversy existed. The
amount set by the appraisers could be enforced, however, in a future
controversy arising out of the lease.
In framing arbitration legislation for landlords and tenants in Illi-
nois it would be well to consider several points: the limitation put by
courts upon a general executory agreement to arbitrate, the difference
between arbitration and appraisal, and the suitability of the present
arbitration statute.
Recording and execution of leases. Illinois statutes do not re-
quire the recording of leases. However, under the Torrens system
of land registration, available to all counties in Illinois but used only
in Cook county, leases and other instruments creating a charge on land
may be registered. 95
In cases where leases are executed outside the state of Illinois
affecting property in the state, such leases are valid if good where
executed.96
Payment of taxes in lieu of rent. It is not lawful in Illinois for
an alien landlord to provide in the lease that the payment of taxes by
the tenant shall constitute a part of the rent.
97
Limitation of action on leases. In the case of written leases,
suit may be brought in Illinois within ten years after the cause of ac-
tion accrues, or within ten years after any payment or written promise
to pay has been made.98 In the case of oral agreements, suit may be
commenced within five years after the accrual of the cause of action.99
Death of life tenant. The death of a life tenant terminates imme-
diately his rights in the property. At common law a tenant of the life
tenant had no further right in the property and, in case rent was not
94. Pearson v. Sanderson, 128 111. 88, 21 N. E. 200 (1889)
95. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 30, sec. 103
96. Same, ch. 30, sec. 154
97. Same, ch. 6, sec. 9
98. Same, ch. 83, sec. 17
99. Same, ch. 83, sec. 16
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yet due, could move and escape paying it.
100 To remedy this situation
the Illinois legislature in 1897 passed "an Act in relation to landlord
and tenant" 101 providing that:
"When a tenant for life shall demise any lands and shall die on or
after the day when any rent becomes due and payable; his executors or
administrators may recover from the undertenant the whole rent due, but
if any such tenant for life shall die before the day when any rent is to
become due, his executors and administrators may recover the proportion
of rent which accrued before his death, and the remainderman shall re-
cover the residue."
The constitutionality of this act has been attacked. In Wilson v.
Hagey,
102 the defendant claimed that this was special legislation, that
it deprived him of his property without due process of law, and that
the subject matter was not related to the title as is required by the
Illinois constitution. The court refused to sustain any of these argu-
ments and held the act constitutional. This holding is significant
because the same arguments raised in this case would probably be
urged against general landlord-tenant legislation in case its constitu-
tionality were attacked.
Evaluating improvements in cases of ejectment. While the pro-
cedure under those sections of the ejectment statute relative to im-
provement valuation103 does not have general application to farm ten-
ancy, yet the method used and recognized by the legislature, being
similar to that often proposed for evaluating lasting improvements
made by a farm tenant, is worth considering.
The law provides that any five of seven persons nominated by the
court shall:
"
.... go on the premises and after viewing the same .... assess the
value of all such lasting and valuable improvements .... [as] shall have
been made prior to the receipt of such notice [of adverse claim] ....
and also assess all damages the land may have sustained by the commission
of any kind of waste or reduction of soil by cultivation or otherwise . . . ."
The Act further provides that the persons nominated shall, when
making an assessment, "carefully distinguish between such improve-
ments as were ma'de on the land prior to notice and those which were
made after notice," and shall also consider "all such necessary and
lasting improvements as shall have been made .... after the receipt
of such notice."
100. Elaine v. Elaine, 202 111. App. 453 (1917)
101. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 80, sec. 36
102. Wilson v. Hagey, 251 111. 452, 96 N. E. 277 (1911)
103. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 45, sees. 56, 57
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A similar method for the evaluation of improvements at the ter-
mination of an ordinary farm tenancy might be used.
Descent, dower, homestead, and taxation. General laws on
descent, 104 dower, 105 homestead, 106 and taxation107 have an effect
upon farm tenancy. None of these are discussed here, however,
because a thoro analysis would not only be a large task, but would be
of doubtful value from the standpoint of the farm-tenancy problem,
unless something more extensive than tenancy reform were con-
templated.
Limitations on landlord's ownership. In addition to these laws
there are those which affect the ownership of the landlord in such a
way that tenancy is influenced. For example, an insurance company,
within three years after the acquisition of land mortgaged to it, may
be required to dispose of the land
108
; likewise, an alien landlord can
hold title to land for only six years after he reaches his twenty-first
birthday.
109
Rural zoning. In Illinois rural zoning has not proceeded to the
point where it has any appreciable effect upon farm tenancy. An act
relating to county zoning
110 has some provisions with relation to hous-
ing, but the act specifically states that the regulations are not to be
imposed upon land used for agricultural purposes.
Game and fish privileges. Tenants are given certain privileges
on the farm with respect to game and fish. They have a right to de-
stroy any wild bird or wild animal (other than game birds or migra-
tory water fowls) damaging their property, 111 and they and their chil-
dren actually residing on the land may hunt,112 trap,113 and fish,114
on their own land without procuring a license, so long as they abide
by the laws relative to game, fur-bearing animals, and fish.
104. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 3, 39
105. Same, ch. 3, 41
106. Same, ch. 52, sees. 1-12
107. Same, ch. 120
108. Same, ch. 73, sec. 740
109. Same, ch. 6, sec. 2 .
110. Same, ch. 34, sec. 152
111. Same, ch. 61, sec. 78
112. Same, ch. 61, sec. 79
113. Same, ch. 61, sec. 80
114. Same, ch. 56, sec. 66
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LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIPS UNDER
COMMON LAW
The Illinois legislature has given statutory recognition to the com-
mon law of England as follows115 : "The common law of England, so
far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes
and acts of parliament made in aid of and to supply the defects of the
common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First" (1607),
excepting certain acts under Elizabeth and Henry VIII are in full force
until modified or repealed by legislative authority.
Illinois common law includes in addition those principles laid
down by the state courts, particularly those of Illinois. There is a
difference of opinion about the extent to which common law, emanates
from the federal courts. Undoubtedly some does come from that
source, but little that would be in point on the general subject of land-
lord-tenant relationships.
Implied Covenants in Farm Leases
In the absence of specific agreement covering the manner in which
farm property is to be handled by a tenant, the courts have held that
certain reasonable duties on his part are implied. Among the principles
laid down are the following116 : Only a reasonable use of the property
for the purpose for which it is obtained is permissible; no waste
should be committed; the farming should be done in a husbandlike
manner; the soil should not be unnecessarily exhausted by negligent
or improper tillage ; and repairs should be made. In addition, a tenant
is presumed to conduct the farm business according to well-established
customs or usages of the region in which he lives, unless the lease
specifically provides or implies otherwise.
While the tenant shall not farm in such a way as to injure the
freehold, he is neither required to yield up the tenancy in the same
condition as it was when he took it, nor in every respect to have
properly tilled, manured, or pastured it. On the other hand the tenant
can set up no claim for farming the land in a more beneficial manner
than was required. Leases are governed by the laws applying to con-
tracts. Where no express agreement appears, rules of common law,
statutes, and the "customs of the country" govern questions which
arise.117
115. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939, ch. 28, sec. 1
116. Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527 (1873)
117. See generally 36 Corpus Juris 97-110, 682-717
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Doctrine of Waste as a Basis for Land Usage
The doctrine of waste, as it has been developed by the courts, has
not furnished an adequate basis for establishing good land usage.
Failure on the part of the courts to get scientific information on the
problems coming under their scrutiny has resulted in vague principles.
The theory of equitable waste, allowing an owner to prevent an obvious
injury to the premises altho the practices causing the injury may not
be prohibited by the terms of the lease, has helped somewhat in pro-
tecting the landlord.
118 A distinction as to the amount of waste per-
mitted has been drawn between a life tenant and a tenant for a year or
a term of years, giving a life tenant much more liberty to commit
waste. 119 The language of many wills and deeds creating life estates
includes the statement "without impeachment of waste," which excuses
the life tenant still further from making a reasonable use of the
premises. The courts distinguish "permissive" waste, meaning damage
which the tenant fails to prevent, from "voluntary" waste, meaning
damage resulting from positive acts of the tenant. Liability is much
greater for voluntary waste.
Among the specific things courts in this country have called waste
are over-tillage, unusual rotations, clearing woods, breaking up pastures,
altering buildings, cutting hay too early, sowing a pernicious crop,
destroying fruit trees, removing ornamental trees, sowing all the land
to wheat shortly before the end of the term, and selling manure.
Altho in the absence of an agreement a tenant does not have to
spread manure, he cannot in this country, without the consent of the
landlord, remove manure produced from feed grown on the farm.
According to a Canadian case120 also, manure cannot be considered as
an emblement removable by the tenant at the end of his term.
Other Illinois Decisions Based on Common Law
The crop of a share tenant belongs to the tenant until it is
divided and the landlord's portion set apart.121 This rule is well estab-
lished in Illinois.
118. See 27 Ruling Case Law 1013-1015, U. S. v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53
(1876) ; Keogh v. Peck, 316 111. 318, 147 N. E. 266, 38 A. L. R. 115 (1925)
119. Ohio Oil Co. v. Daugherty, 240 111. 361, 88 N. E. 818, 36 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1108 (1909) ; Bender v. Bender, 292 111. 358, 127 N. E. 22 (1920) ; Fifer v.
Allen, 228 111. 507, 81 N. E. 1105 (1907)
120. Atkinson v. Farrell, 27 Ont. L. 204, 8 Dom. L. A. 582 (1912)
121. Sargent v. Courrier, 66 111. 245 (1872); Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 111. 372,
89 Am. D. 312 (1866) ; Alwood v. Ruckman, 21 111. 200 (1859) ; Grotefendt v.
Schlaeppi-Siever, 213 111. App. 436 (1920) ; John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Watson, 200 111. App. 315 (1917)
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The right to maintain trespass belongs to the tenant once he has
gone into possession, and may be enforced even against the landlord
unless he is there for the collection of rent, for necessary inspection
of the premises, to deliver a notice, or by permission.
The right to sue for injury to the farm or property on it depends
on the right of the claimant in the property damaged. Where a rail-
road embankment caused an overflow of water on the tenant's crops, the
right was held to be solely in the tenant.
122 In such cases the courts try
to determine whose property is injured. Because crops belong to the
tenant until divided, the court held that he had the right to sue and
that the landlord did not, altho the latter's rent was payable out of the
crop. Injury to the freehold (buildings, fences, trees, etc.), on the
other hand, would give the landlord a cause of action.
A tenant's knowledge of conditions prevailing on the farm at the
time he makes his agreement may limit rights that he would otherwise
have. For example, a tenant's knowledge when leasing land that the
outlet to a ditch draining the land had been obstructed by a neighbor
prevented him from recovering for subsequent damage to his crops. 123
Special assessments levied by a drainage district were construed
not to be covered by a lease which provided that all assessments levied
against the premises should be paid by the lessee.
124
SUMMARY OF ILLINOIS LAWS RELATING TO
FARM LANDLORD AND TENANT
1. No provision is made in the Illinois state constitution for the
landlord-tenant relationship.
2. Most Illinois legislation pertaining to landlords and tenants
concerns the landlord-tenant relationship as a whole and is not
designed specifically for farm tenancy.
3. One large body of statutes consists of remedies for the collec-
tion of rent. The actions of debt, assumpsit, replevin, attachment, and
garnishment affect farm tenancy only generally. Distress for rent and
the provisions for distress before rent is due apply more directly to
farm tenancies. Under the distress action tenants may exempt the
same items which they are allowed to exempt under an execution.
4. The landlord's lien for rent against crops grown during the
year the rent accrues applies to any purchaser who knows that his
122. Uffleman v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 194 111. App. 42
(1916)
123. Funston v. Hoffman, 223 111. 360, 83 N. E. 917 (1908)
124. Carlyle v. Bartels, 315 111. 271, 146 N. E. 192 (1924)
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vendor is a tenant and that he has raised the crops on rented land. A
landlord must use an appropriate action to enforce his lien.
5. The Illinois statute on abandonment protects a farm landlord
to the extent of rent and expenses, so far as he is able to mature and
harvest crops left by the tenant, but it does not make provision for
damages resulting from the abandonment.
6. The right to emblements and away-going crops is recognized
by Illinois courts.
7. Oral leases which cannot be performed within one year from
the time they are made are void in Illinois. The judicial creation of
"tenancy from year to year," however, gives an oral lease effectiveness,
so far as the agreement can be determined from existing facts and
evidence, provided that either party to the oral lease has relied on the
lease and made a substantial performance. To terminate such a lease,
written notice must be delivered from one party to the other not less
than 60 days nor more than 4 months prior to 60 days before the
termination of the tenancy.
8. Tenants not subject to distress for rent may take from the
rented premises removable fixtures which they have built, provided
they do so while they are still in possession of the land as tenants.
The definition of "removable" is vague, but in general it means im-
provements which can be removed without undue injury to the
premises.
9. For the eviction of farm tenants no special actions are pro-
vided in Illinois law. Ejectment, and forcible entry and detainer may
be used.
10. Illinois statutory provisions for submitting disputes to arbi-
tration can be used by farm landlords and tenants, but owing to judi-
cial construction the agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced if it
precedes the controversy. This construction prevents agreements for
arbitration contained in farm leases from being binding and effective if
one party refuses to arbitrate.
11. Common-law principles serve as a general guide in landlord-
tenant relationships, particularly under oral leases, but they are not
complete or modern enough to apply to all the issues that arise.
12. Many Illinois statutes, such as those on descent, dower,
homestead, wills, administrators and executors, and taxation, have an
indirect effect on farm tenancy. These laws, however, have not all been
drafted with the objective of good land use or improved tenancy in
mind, and there is consequently need for improvement in them.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR A FARM-TENANCY CODE
FOR ILLINOIS
Emphasis is given by agricultural economists and others to the need
for legislation to improve landlord-tenant relationships. Altho legis-
lation alone cannot bring about completely desirable conditions, fair
and workable laws can do much to prevent injustice in cases where
no adequate agreement or understanding exists between landlord and
tenant. The report of the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy
recommends that states should consider suggestions for the improve-
ment of lease contracts and general landlord-tenant relations.
One of the most urgent needs is a clearer distinction between farm
and urban tenancy than that which exists under present laws. Also,
because it is impossible to make laws that will apply to every problem
arising under farm-tenancy agreements, such laws as are made must
be carefully drawn to cover as many problems as possible. Laws
covering leasing agreements will need to be adjusted from time to
time to meet changing economic and social conditions.3
For the benefit and convenience of Illinois farm landlords and
tenants and others concerned with the law, the existing and suggested
Illinois laws on farm tenancy need be brought together in a farm-
tenancy code. In the following outline and discussion no attempt has
been made to set up the sections as they would appear in a sample
code, but rather to set forth either thru discussion or direct statement
those provisions which appear to be essential.
Purpose of Code
The immediate purpose of the code should be to establish certain
regulations which, in the absence of an adequate contract, will make
the relationship between landlord and tenant more equitable than com-
mon law, custom, and statutes have made it heretofore. The ultimate
purpose should be to help assure to the public a wise use of land.
Definition of Farm Tenancy
The term "farm tenancy" should apply to all instances where an
owner of farm land conveys to a tenant a right over the use of that
land and in return receives either cash, a share of the crop, a share
of the livestock, or any combination of these forms of payment. Share-
cropping should also be included under the definition of farm tenancy.
"See "Farm Leases for Illinois," Univ. 111. Agr. Sta. and Ext. Cir. 503
(1940)
1940] LEGAL ASPECTS OF FARM TENANCY 265
Creation and Termination of Tenancy
Written leases are desirable, and almost indispensable to the
development of efficient farm-operation plans, but it is not felt that
written leases should be required by law. In the first place, such a
statute would probably fail to change materially the status of many
of those landlords and tenants who under present conditions are con-
tent with oral leases. Under the statute of frauds, oral leases which
cannot be performed within a year are void; but because of the high
percentage of such leases the courts have found it necessary to create
"tenancies from year to year." The courts would undoubtedly find it
necessary to do the same if an additional statute requiring a written
lease were enacted and the parties failed to execute such a lease.
In the second place, a requirement that all farm leases be written
would tend to favor landlords because of their superior experience
with business instruments. Any attempt to equalize the position of
landlord and tenant thru legislative regulation of the provisions in
leases would be very complicated and detailed. A lease adapted to one
farm and to particular individuals may not be adapted to a neighbor-
ing farm or other individuals.
Present laws for notice to terminate a tenancy should be changed
so that a written notice would be required to be given by either party
at least six months before the expiration of the tenancy. The six-
month period would give both landlord and tenant time to plan their
programs for the following year. In individual cases, however, where
the tenant has become well established on the farm and has made
investments in livestock and equipment suited to the farm, the notice
to terminate the lease should be given at least a year in advance. This
provision for a notice longer than six months would not be a part of
the code but should be made a part of the individual lease.
Farm leases should terminate February 1 instead of March 1,
now the customary date. February 1 is much more desirable from the
standpoint of planning and performing certain operations on the new
farm. It is not felt that such a provision could be incorporated into
the statute
;
it is merely suggested as a point to be included in the edu-
cational program that should supplement the code.
Laws relating to tenancies from year to year should be codified
in this section on creation and termination of tenancies.
Implied Rights and Duties Under Tenancy Agreements
The best written farm leases leave little to implication, but many
written leases fail to include even the basic requirements of the law
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and are almost entirely devoid of provisions which promote good
farming. Oral agreements, of course, are still less satisfactory. This
section of the code should therefore state as a matter of law that the
following duties always exist on the part of the tenant:
1. To use proper methods of tillage.
2. To destroy weeds.
3. To spread manure.
4. To keep tile outlets and drainage ditches open.
5. To make reasonable repairs where no cash outlay is involved and
where an unusual amount of labor is not required.
6. To cause no destruction or impairment to the land or property thru
neglect or improper management.
Because the common-law doctrine of waste is generally inadequate,
the above provisions are desirable to give the landlord a valid claim
where circumstances warrant.
This section of the code should also state the following duties on
the part of the landlord:
1. To repair buildings and fences.
2. To insure the undisturbed occupancy of the tenant by the payment
of all taxes and assessments against the property.
3. To maintain adequate drainage, a satisfactory water supply, and
such minimum standards of housing as are prescribed by law.
This section on implied rights and duties should be revised and
expanded whenever changing conditions warrant.
Emblements and Away-Going Crops
If notice to terminate is given according to law, there will be no
problem of away-going crops (crops harvested by a tenant after the
expiration of his lease). Where special circumstances such as aban-
donment or eviction for breach of contract occur and terminate the
holding of the tenant before the crops are harvested, the present law
on abandonment should be applied. The landlord is often handicapped
in caring for the crops when a tenant abandons the premises, and any
damages occasioned by the abandonment should be allowed the land-
lord in addition to rent and expenses. Because livestock-share leases
are becoming more prevalent, the law on abandonment should include
similar provisions with respect to productive livestock owned jointly by
the landlord and tenant.
Landlord's Lien
The present Illinois statute on the landlord's lien and court inter-
pretations put upon it are acceptable. The landlord, as principal in-
vestor in the farm enterprise, should have this much protection.
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Lien statutes have been criticized by some agricultural economists
because they interfere with the securing of production credit. The
farm enterprise, however, is more likely to be injured by the tenant's
failure to pay his rent and prevent the attachment of the lien, than it
is by his failure to secure production credit. The law should provide
that the landlord may waive his lien where such waiver is necessary
for the tenant to secure production credit.
Suggestions that the lien be modified in the event of crop failure
or a drop in prices proceed from reasonable motives, but such modifi-
cations would be difficult to apply. Of much more value would be the
adoption by the landlord and tenant of some method for adjusting the
rent. The Illinois landlord's lien applies only to crops grown and
growing, and not to other property of the tenant; which relieves it of
many of the objections brought against liens of other states.
County Landlord-Tenant Commission
A county landlord-tenant commission should be established. It
might be composed of the county judge, and two landowners and two
tenant farmers elected from the county for a period of two years. It
should be responsible for any appraisals which need to be made in
carrying out this code; and it should have authority to settle certain
questions of fact, as distinguished from questions of law, arising under
provisions of the code.
Compensation for Improvements
The English Agricultural Holdings Act. allowing tenants com-
pensation for improvements made by them, and generally cited as a
model law, has three parts: one with respect to improvements requir-
ing the consent of the landlord ; another with respect to improvements
requiring notice to the landlord (drainage being the only item in-
cluded) ; and a third with respect to improvements requiring neither
notice nor consent. In Illinois two divisions should be adequate: one
requiring the landlord's consent, and another requiring notice, but no
consent. In many cases the notice would merely amount to the tenant's
telling the landlord his general farming plans, which is after all
desirable.
In each division should be listed the important improvements which
might be made. Provision should be made that questions as to the
nature of improvements not listed or not clear should be taken to the
county landlord-tenant commission. A great deal of care should be
exercised in preparing these schedules so that they will apply to Illi-
nois farming, and so that no injustice will be worked on either party.
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Improvements requiring the consent of the landlord might include
the following:
1. Construction, alteration, removal, or major repair of buildings and
permanent fences.
2. Construction and repair of levees, tile lines, and drainage ditches.
3. Construction and repair of roads and bridges necessary on the farm.
4. Construction and repair of check dams, terraces, and other per-
manent and semi-permanent structures necessary to the conservation of
the land.
5. Planting and care of woodlots and orchards.
6. Clearing land of obstructions to cultivation.
Improvements requiring notice to but not the consent of the land-
lord might include the following:
1. The spreading of limestone, phosphate, and other purchased fer-
tilizers. The tenant should receive compensation for the difference between
the value of the unexhausted fertilizers at the conclusion of the tenancy
and the value of the fertilizers which were applied but unused at the
beginning of the tenancy and for which the tenant did not pay.
2. Plowing under green manures and the seeding of permanent or
temporary pastures which would improve and conserve the soil. The tenant
should receive compensation for the difference between the value of such
practices at the termination of the tenancy and the value of permanent and
temporary pastures and green-manure crops which were on the farm at
the beginning of the tenancy and for which the tenant did not pay.
3. Removable improvements of value to an incoming tenant.
The law should require that a tenant, in order to establish a valid
claim for compensation for the unexhausted value of any items in
either of the above two classes, must have in his possession adequate
evidence of his expenditures, such as bills of sale, receipts, and records
of the farm business. If the landlord and tenant cannot agree upon
the value of unexhausted improvements, the county landlord-tenant
commission should be requested to determine the appropriateness
of the improvements for the farm and to fix a fair value on such
improvements.
If the tenant moves before he is paid such a sum for unexhausted
improvements as has been agreed upon by the landlord and tenant or
fixed by the county landlord-tenant commission, the sum due the ten-
ant should constitute a lien against the property, and should be
made payable within a definite period, probably six months.
Damages for Unjust Disturbance
When a lease is terminated for an unjust cause, the injured party
should be entitled to an award of damages suffered because of the
termination. If the damages are not paid as requested, the aggrieved
party should be given the advantage of a simplified procedure
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before the county court to determine whether or not the disturb-
ance was unjust. If the county court finds that the disturbance
was unjust, it should request the landlord-tenant commission to
determine the damages resulting from the disturbance.
Unjust disturbance would not, however, include notice given in
accordance with the suggested law providing for six months' notice.
While this differs from the English law allowing a disturbance pay-
ment, even when notice is given as provided in the lease, it is felt that
in Illinois long-term leases should be encouraged by education rather
than by any type of coercion.
The rights conferred upon landlords and tenants by this section
should be supplementary to the right of either of them to test whether
or not the lease has been breached. The purpose of the section should
be to give some protection to parties who have a good defense to an
action for a breach of their lease but who would be in a worse position
by defending than by simply considering the lease terminated.
Minimum Housing and Health Standards
Surveys which have been made in Illinois indicate that certain
minimum housing and health standards should be set up. These are
important, not only from the standpoint of the tenant, but also from
the standpoint of better landlord-tenant feeling. The following re-
quirements should be included:
1. Safe and adequate water supply, properly protected
2. Sanitary toilet
3. Sound roof, walls, foundation, and floors
Any complaints about housing or health standards should be filed
with the landlord-tenant commission. The commission could order an
investigation to be made by the proper health authorities. If the au-
thorities find that these standards have not been met, a notice should
be sent to the landlord giving him 30 days in which to correct the
deficiencies. If these are not corrected within 30 days after notice, the
law should provide for a mandatory injunction to be issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction requiring the work to be done or that it may
be performed and charged to the landlord.
Limitation of Rights Created by the Code
Finally, in order to prevent ill-considered waiving of rights at the
time leases are made, the code should contain the provision that,
except as provided by law, no landlord or tenant, thru any agreement
written or otherwise, may limit the rights accorded to either by the
provisions of the code.
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ILLINOIS STATUTES RELATING TO FARM TENANCY
(In Illinois Revised Statutes 1939)
Abandonment of premises (crops). Ch. 80, sec. 33.
Alien landlords. Ch. 6, sec. 2.
Arbitration. Ch. 10, sec. 1.
Chattel mortgages (feed, unplanted crops, etc.). Ch. 95, sec. la.
Civil Practice Act (scope). Ch. 110, sec. 125.
Common law. Ch. 28, sec. 1.
County zoning. Ch. 34, sec. 152.
Demand for rent. Ch. 80, sees. 7, 8.
Descent. Ch. 39. See also ch. 3.
Distress before rent due. Ch. 80, sec. 35.
Distress for rent. Ch. 80, sees. 16-30.
Distress for rent (allegation of defendant). Ch. 119, sec. 19.
Dower. Ch. 41. See also ch. 3.
Ejectment. Ch. 45.
Election of property for execution. Ch. 77, sec. 11.
Employers' liability. Ch. 48, sees. 138-143.
Exemptions (debtors). Ch. 52, sec. 13.
Fences, legal definition, repair, etc. Ch. 54.
Fish, rights of tenant. Ch. 56, sec. 66.
Fixtures (removal). Ch. 80, sec. 34.
Forcible Entry and Detainer. Ch. 57.
Game, rights of tenant. Ch. 61, sees. 78-80.
Homestead. Ch. 52, sees. 1-12.
Improvements (evaluation in case of ejectment). Ch. 45, sees. 56, 57.
Insurance companies (holding title to real property). Ch. 73, sec. 740.
Justice of the peace (jurisdiction). Ch. 79, sec. 16.
Landlord and tenant (general remedies). Ch. 80, sees. 1-4.
Lease defined. Ch. 80, sec. 13.
Leases executed out of state. Ch. 30, sec. 154.
Lien (landlord's). Ch. 80, sees. 31, 32.
Liens (generally). Ch. 82.
Life estate (death of lessee having). Ch. 80, sec. 36.
Limitations on actions. Ch. 83, sees. 16, 17.
Mechanic's lien. Ch. 82, sees. 1-39.
Notice to quit. Ch. 80, sees. 9-12.
Notice to terminate "tenancy by the month." Ch. 80, sec. 6.
Notice to terminate "tenancy from year to year." Ch. 80, sec. 5.
Registration of leases (Torrens system). Ch. 30, sec. 103.
Remedies extended in favor of grantees, lessees, etc. Ch. 80, sees. 14, 15.
Replevin. Ch. 119, sec. 1.
Statute of Frauds. Ch. 59, sees. 1, 2.
Summary judgments (for possession of land). Ch. 110, sec. 181.
Taxation. Ch. 120.
Taxes (payment by tenant having alien landlord). Ch. 6, sec. 9.
Waste (by administrators and executors). Ch. 3, sec. 231.
Waste (commission by widow). Ch. 3, sec. 192.
Waste (precept to stay waste in ejectment proceedings). Ch. 45, sec. 62.
Waste (prohibition against endowed persons). Ch. 3, sec. 191.
Weeds (duty to destroy noxious weeds). Ch. 139, sec. 39 (5); Ch. 121, sees.
56 (8), 150; Ch. 38, sees. 89, 90; Ch. 18.
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GLOSSARY
Assumpsit a form of legal action which may be used to recover damages
caused by failure to perform a simple contract.
Attachment a writ or order of the court commanding the sheriff to
seize the property of a defendant to an action and to hold the
property as security for the satisfaction of such judgment as may be
rendered in the case.
Chattel any item of personal property as distinguished from real estate.
Chattel mortgage a mortgage of personal property as security for a
debt.
Chattel real a legal instrument representing a right to real estate, such
as a lease.
Common law rules developed thru decisions of the courts and applied
by them as a matter of precedent.
Demise a conveyance of real estate or of an interest in real estate.
Distrain to take, thru legal process, the property of another and hold
it to secure the payment of an obligation, usually rent.
Distress a procedure thru which property may be taken and held to
satisfy a debt.
Ejectment a legal process to force an occupant from land and take
possession; also to determine questions of title.
Emblements growing crops which a tenant has the right to harvest and
remove after he leaves the premises following termination of the
tenancy.
Forcible entry and detainer a simplified legal action for obtaining
possession of land.
Garnishment a legal process by which wages, salary, or other income
of a debtor may be taken to satisfy a judgment in law.
Lien a legal claim against items of property for services or materials
expended on such property.
Life estate the right to possess, use, and take profits from land during
the life of the holder or during the life of another.
Remainderman a person who takes property, by provisions in a will or
deed, after a life tenant dies.
Replevin a legal action for the recovery of goods or property wrong-
fully taken.
Reversioner a person who takes property at the death of a life tenant
in cases where the remainder has not been disposed of by the
original owner. The reversioner is the original grantor or his heirs.
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A Tenant Asks
Should I have a written lease? The answer is on page 249
What are my rights without a written lease? Page 250b
Have I a right to harvest crops after my lease has expired? Page 248b
What farm practices are illegally wasteful? Page 26Ib
May I remove fixtures that I have added to the property? Page 251
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Has my landlord a right to come onto the farm whenever he wishes?
Page 262a
What exemptions may I claim when I am sued for rent? Page 244
Who has the right to sue when the farm property is damaged my
landlord or I? Page 262a
What fish and game privileges do I have? Page 259c
A Landlord Asks
What can I do when my tenant leaves before the end of his term?
The answer is on page 248a
What legal means are there to help me collect my rent? Pages 241-245
How is an oral lease legally terminated? Page 25la
Does my lien give me a right to immediate possession of the crops?
Page 247b
Does my lien apply to anything but crops? Page 246a
How may I legally evict a tenant? Pages 253, 254
Do farm leases have to be recorded? Page 257b
What are the advantages and limitations of an agreement to arbitrate?
Pages 255, 256
How much notice must be given to terminate an unwritten lease?
Page 250b
FOR A DETAILED GUIDE to information in this bulletin
about the legal rights and relationships of Illinois farm land-
lords and tenants, turn to the INDEX on pages 274 and 275.
10,0004-4018318
10,0502-4120767
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